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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~I·:ClTRITY TrrPLE INSlT£\AXCI<~ 
AU I•:NCY, nm\· known as ~I·:CURI­
TY TLTLE GrAR.AKTY C 0 ).1-
P.\\'Y, and ~ECURITY TITLE 
l 10:\l P.\ :.;y, l'tah eorporations, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
:-:J·:CUHITY T;;:·~ INSURANCE \ 
CU:\rP1\XY. a California corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 1 
Defendant .. Appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing 
Case No. 
9925 
Th~ Defendant-Appellant, Security Title Insurance 
Company, a Utah corporation, petitions the Court for a 
rehearing in the above entitled case, the Court by its 
opinion filed Decen1ber 31, 1963, having affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court. 
This petition is based upon the facts which undis-
putably show that the plaintiffs do not have exclusive 
n~P of tht> words "Security Title" and, therefore, such 
words as a 1natter of law, could not have acquired a 
~reondary meaning in favor of the plaintiffs. Further-
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uwre, the Court has overlooked the established law 
which holds that even though a secondary meaning may 
have been acquired, such does not give rise to a mon-
opolistic right to the use of the words or name in 
question, but only a right to require that another user 
of the name properly distinguish itself. 
McKAY AND BURTON 
and MACOY A. Mcl\IURRAY 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Ut~h 
( J g- ' ' ,/r((.-~;1/ ' ( ~ ( ~(/{/ L;Jf- .- jf//.-/1 ;_{I 
By ··;··--ii~~~~--A:·-~:r-~it~~:~:~~---·-··· I I! 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SI•:CPHITY TITLE IXSFRANCI·~ 1 
.\(:K~~'"CY, now known as SECURI-
TY rriTL~~ Gr ARANTY C 0 .M-
PA~Y. and SECl~RITY TITLE 
CO~IP .. \XY, Utah corporations, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
- vs.-
SI·~CPHITY TITLE INSURANCE 
CO~I P .. \~Y. a California corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 
9925 
Defendant-Appellant's Brief in Support 
of Petition for Rehearing 
POINT NO. I 
IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE ACQUIRED 
A SECONDARY MEANING TO THE WORDS "SE-
CURITY TITLE," THIS COURT HAS OVERLOOKED 
THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHICH SHOW THAT 
SUCH WORDS HAVE NOT BEEN EXCLUSIVELY 
APPROPRIATED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AND 
HENCE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, NO SECONDARY 
MEANIXG CAN ATTACH TO THE SAME IN FAVOR 
OF THE PLAINTIFFS. 
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This Court, by its silence, has in effect held, con-
trary to the well established law in the field, that a 
secondary rneaning may attach to certain words in favor 
of a non-exclusive user thereof. We call to the Court'~ 
attention that apparently, through oversight, no con-
sideration was given to the matters of law referred to 
in the two points considered in the defendant-appellant's 
reply brief. 
Counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents based a major 
portion of his argtunent on the finding of the trial 
court that the words "Security Title" had acquired a 
secondary rneaning in favor of plaintiffs. It was in 
reply to this argument that we pointed out in our reply 
brief on pages 5 through 9, it is imperative that for a 
secondary meaning to attach to certain words or a 
name, such words or name must exclusively identify the 
clain1ant. 
It is clear from the record that Security Title and 
Abstract Company in Provo, Utah, is a separate entity, 
not a party to this action, and was the first user of 
the words "Security Title" ni the State of Utah in con-
nection with title activities ( T. 123). Such company 
still exists today. In addition, Security Title Company 
in Ogden, Utah, and Security Title Company in Kays-
ville and Farmington, Utah, are separate entities. 
Neither of plaintiffs owns or controls Security Title & 
Abstract Company in Provo, Security Title Company 
of Ogden, or Security ·Title Company in Kaysville and 
Farmington. (R. 157, 158, 186, 188). 
Plaintiffs did at the time of the trial attempt to 
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:-~how that th(• use of the words "Security Title" by these 
('ntiti('s and emnpanies other than the plaintiffs was 
with the consent and agreeinent of the plaintiffs. How-
PVI'I', such agreement and consent, even if they exist, 
ur·p of no aid to plaintiffs. 
In support of this proposition, the Court's attention 
is invited to the case of Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk 
Tl'achcrs' .. :l,qeucy, 3 Fed. (2d) 7 (8CCA 1924), where 
the Court said : 
'"The evidence shows that the use of the 
plaintiff's trade-name by the many local offices, 
under the sanction of contracts made by the plain-
tiff assuming to license the use of the trade-name, 
has caused the name to lose its distinctiveness as 
the trade-name of the plaintiff. The service ren-
dPred to teachers and officers of schools has for 
man~· years represented generally to such per-
sons and to the public, not the efforts, the experi-
ence, or the responsibility of the plaintiff, but of 
the persons conducting these local offices. As 
was said in Powell v. Birminghom Vinegar Brew-
ing Co., 2 Ch. D. (L.R. 189·6) 54, 73: ''There is 
another way in which a name originally a good 
tradename may lose its character and become 
publici juris, i.e., when the first person using 
the nan1e does not claim the right to prevent 
others from using it, and allows others to use 
it without complaint. The name then comes to 
denote the article and nothing more; the name 
becmnes publici juris, and any one is at liberty 
to make the article and call it by the name by 
which it is usually known'." 
'The evidence readily demonstrates that there has 
been no such exclusive use of the words "Security Title" 
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by either of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are both Utah 
corporations. On Dece1nber 1, 1944, Security Title Com-
pany was incorporated (Ex. 9). This company did busi- s: 
ness in Salt Lake City until 1957, when it ehanged its 
nmne to "Security Title Insurance Agency" (T. 126). 
On June 21, 1962, after the commencement of this action, 
the name was again changed to "Security Title Guaranty 
Company," which is the present name of one of the 
plaintiff corporations. The plaintiff "Security Title 
Company" was incorporated in 19·57 and its functions 
are limited to title activities in Salt Lake County ('T .128). 
In short, the plaintiffs at the trial would have had 
to have demonstrated that the words "Security Title" 
have been used exclusively and solely identified the 
plaintiffs. See also Sterling Products Corp., vs. Sterling 
Products, Inc., 45 Fed. Supp. 960 (S. D.N.Y. 1942).· 
Another case illustrating the principle is Campbell 
Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 81 F. Supp. 114 (D.C. Pa. 
1948), the Court stated : 
"·The essence of the trade-1nark is that it shall 
be a true badge of origin indicating that the 
contents to which it is affixed is the product of 
the trade-mark proprietor and no others, or as it 
it put by Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade-
Marks, Fourth Edition, Vol. Two, p. 1289: '*** 
it is vital to the existence of a trade-mark that 
it should be used by one and by only one concern. 
A trade-mark cannot serve two masters; it can-
not identify two sources at the same time and 
remain a trade-mark.' '' 
The Campbell Soup Co. case involved a technical trade-
mark. It follows that when considering the concept of 
secondary meaning, the same rule would be applicable. 
--~ 
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X nrnerous authorities could be eited in support of thi~ 
proposition. 
In short, the plaintiffs at the trial would have had 
to have demonstrated that the words ''Security Title'' 
have been used exclusively by and solely identified the 
plaintiffs. See also Sterling Products Corp. vs. Sterling 
Products, Inc., 45 Fed. Supp. 960 (S. D.N.Y. 1942). 
In this regard, it is most significant that involved 
in this case are two plaintiffs, each claiming the benefit 
of a secondary meaning to the words "Security Title." 
The very essence of "secondary meaning" is that certain 
words identify one particular source. The question is 
appropriately asked which one of the plaintiffs is identi-
fit•d by the words "Security Title"~ Furthermore, the 
words .. Security Title" in the Provo area certainly do 
not refer to either of the plaintiffs. If any secondary 
meaning has attached to those words, it would be in 
favor of a local entity in the Provo area which is not 
t>ven a party to this action. Certainly, the plaintiff 
::;hould not be entitled to have enjoined the use of the 
words "Security Title" in the Provo area when such 
use causes no association whatsoever with either of the 
plaintiffs in this case. Similarly, in the Farmington 
and Davis County area, the words "Security Title" do 
not refer to either of the plaintiffs but again consider-
ing the evidence nwst favorable to the plaintiffs merely 
identify local entities in that area. The same is true 
in the Ogden area. 
This court has stated that the words "Security Title" 
have acquired a secondary meaning. The defendant-
appellant has a right to ask who is identified by such 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
words? The Provo Con1pany 1 Either or both of the 
plaintiff companies in Salt Lake City 1 The Davis Coun-
ty cmnpany"? Or the Ogden company1 
The very fact that the words "Security Title" identi-
fy so many sources in so many places in the State of 
Utah, nullifies the possibility of a secondary Ineaning 
attaching to the words in favor of any one single entity. 
The fact that the plaintiffs attempted at the trial to 
show that the use of the words "Security Title" by the 
other entites and companies other than the plaintiffs was 
with the consent and agreement of the plaintiffs, does 
not substitute for the requirement of exclusive use. Such 
agreement and consent, if such there be, only demon-
strates that the plaintiffs have consented to a use which 
by its very existence defeats a claim to secondary mean-
ing. The very essence of the concept of "secondary 
meaning" is identification of a single user. 
These words of Judge Learned Hand in the case of 
Coty v. LeBlurne Import Co., 292 F. 264 (1923) are 
squarely in point: "But it is undoubtedly necessary that 
it must signify a single source ... " See also: Shredded 
Wheat Company v. Humphrey Cornell Company, 250 
Fed 960 (CCA, 2d Cir., 1918); Bayer Cmnpany v. United 
Drug Company, 272 F 505 (D.C.S.D. New York, 1921). 
The court's attention is called to the fact that the 
case of Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, 
supra, was a case involving an agreement. There, the 
court recognized that such an agreement was futile to 
prevent the words in question fron1 identifying other 
sources. Hence, the very essence of "secondary mean-
ing" was lost by agreement. 
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POINT NO. II 
CONTRARY TO WELL- ESTABLISHED LAW 
WHICH \VOULD ONLY ENTITLE THE PLAINTIFFS 
TO A RIGHT TO HAVE A SUBSEQUENT USER OF 
THE WORDS DISTINGUISH ITSELF, THIS COURT 
IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT HAS INADVERTENTLY GRANTED THE 
PLAINTIFFS A UNWARRANTED MONOPOLISTIC 
RIGHT TO THE USE OF THE WORDS "SECURITY 
TITLE.'' 
This Court has inadvertently granted to plaintiffs 
a monopolistic right to the use of the words "Security 
Title" throughout the whole of the State of Utah, con-
trary to well-established law governing relief that may 
be granted in fair trade cases involving secondary 
meaning. 
Even if this Court, upon a reconsideration of this 
math'r, should let stand its determination that a sec-
ondary 1neaning had attached to the words "Security 
Title" in favor of plaintiffs, they are not entitled to a 
monopoly in their use. This issue is neither new nor 
novel. Courts throughout the country have considered 
this problem and the holdings are legion that no such 
monopolistic right exists. 
In fair trade cases involving secondary meaning 
the only right the person has in whose favor the sec-
ondary 1neaning of words has attached is to have the 
second user enjoined in the runfair use of such words. 
This is not a technical trade mark case where by statutes 
governing the registration of technical trademarks, a 
monopoly to the use of the mark on words is granted7 
recognized and upheld. 
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Courts that have considered the problems involved 
in protecting a party in the use of words to which a 
secondary meaning has attached, have one after another 
declared that it is only an unfair use that should be 
enjoined - not every use. Exmnples of such holdings 
were set forth in defendant-appellant's brief on pages 
9 through 14 thereof. 
Some of authorities there cited, together with addi-
tional authorities, are as follows : 
Armstrong Paint v. Nu-Enamcl Corp., 305 U.S. 315: 
L.Ed 195 (1938) : 
"This right of freedom does not confer a 
n1onopoly on the use of the words. It is a men· 
protection against their unfair use as a trade-
mark or trade name by a competitor seeking to 
palm off his products as those of the original 
user of the trade name. This right of protection 
from such use belongs to the user of a mark 
which has acquired a secondary meaning." 
Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 Fed. (2d) 402, 403, (GCA, 
Third Cir, 1924) : 
'' ... the utmost the first user of such a name 
after it has acq~tired a secondary meaning can 
insist upon is that no one shall use it against 
him in an 'unfair way. Accordingly, the second 
user becomes an infringer only when he makes 
an unfair use of the mark. Not any competition, 
but only unfair competition on the part of such 
user is actionable. Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall 
(80 U.S. 311, 324; 20 L.Ed. 581); Columbia Mills 
v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 464, 14 S. Ct. 151, 37 L.Ed. 
1144; Elgin Watch Co., v. III Watch Co., 179 U.S. 
665, 21 S. Ct. 270, 45 L.Ed. 365." (Emphasis 
added.) 
10 
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88¢ Stores, /11(·., l'. 11/artinez, 361 P. (2d) 809, (Ore.) 
( 1001): 
''Bttt Cl'('Jt assuming that plaintiff has cre-
ated a secondary meauing in the use of the name 
'Th(' 88¢ Store' or any other name ,plaintiff has 
no ri9ht to restrict the use of that name except 
a.., the 'Use interferes with pla,intiff's sale of mer-
chandise, or the sale of m,erchandise by plaintiff's 
eJtfranchisees over u·hich plaintiff has controls 
relevant to the quality of the goods or services 
Lchich the alleged trade name purports to repre-
seut. Smith v. Dental Products Co., 7 Cir., 19·44, 
140 F. (2d) 140, 145-148; Everett 0. Fisk & Co. 
v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, 8 Gir., 1924, 3 F. (2d) 
7, 8-9; :L\Iorse-Starrett Products Co. v. 8teccone, 
D.C. N.D. Cal. 1949, 86 F. Supp. 796, 805; Sage, 
Trade-~Iark Licenses and 'Control,' 43 Trade-
mark Reporter 675 (19'53); Comment, Develop-
ments in the Law; ·Trade-:iliarks and Unfair Com-
petition, 68 Harv. L. Rev 814, 867, 874 (1955); 
Note, Trade l\1ark-Law - Valid Use of Trade 
Mark by Other Than Owner, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 
482 (1948). (Emphasis added.) 
Sterling Products Corporation v. Sterl-ing Products, 
Inc., -!3 F. Supp. 960, 961, (1942): 
·•rt is not the mere use of the word 'Sterling,' 
but the method or manner of its use which deter-
mines the rights of the parties; in order for the 
plaintiff to prevail it must show that defendants 
make an unfair use of it." 
Richmond Rernedies Co. v. Dr. Miles llfedical Co., 16 
F. (2d) 598, p. 602 (CCA, 8th Cir. 1926): 
If the trade-name consists of a descriptive 
word, no monopoly of the right to use the smne 
11 
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can be acquired. This is but a corollary of the 
proposition that a descriptive word cannot lw 
the subject of a trademark. G. & C. :Merriam Co. 
v. Saalfield (C.C.A.) 198 F. 369. Others may use 
the same or similar descriptive word in connec-
tion with their own wares, provided they take 
proper steps to prevent the public being deceived. 
Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., 
supra; Vacuum Oil Co. v. Climax Refining Co., 
supra; Allen B. \V risley Co. v. Iowa Soap Co., 
122 F. 796 (C.C.A. 8); Heide v. Wallace & Co., 
(C.C.A.) 135 F. 346; Trinidad Asphalt Co. v. 
Standard Paint Co., 163 F. 977 (C.C.A. 8); Walter 
Baker & Co. v. Gray, 192 F. 921, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 
889 ( C.C.A. 8) ; G. & C. :Merriam Co. v. Saalfield 
(C.C.A.) 198 F. 369; S.R. Feil Co. v. Jn. E. 
Robbins Co. (C.C.A.) 220 F. 650. 
Ilottston v. Berde, 2 N.W. 2d 9 p. 10, (Minn. 1942): 
Where generic words are used in a trade-
name, it is only the manner of their use by an-
other that is considered and restrained. There 
must be confusion or deception with implicit rep-
resentation that the goods of the latter are those 
of the first user. Even so, only use which makes 
unfair competition can be enjoined. Yellow Cab 
Co. v. Cook's T. & T. Co., 142 l\1:inn. 120, 171 N.W. 
269. 
United Lace & Braid JJ!lfg. Co. v. Barthals Mfg. Co., 
221 Fed. 456 (D.C., E.D. New York, 1915): 
A word n1ay acquire in trade a secondary 
signification, differing from its primary mean-
ing, and if it is used to persons in the trade 
who will understand it, and be known and in-
tended to understand it, in its secondary sense, 
it will be none the less a falsehood, although in 
its primary sense it may be true. One who uses 
12 
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language whieh will (•onvey to persons reading 
or lwariug- it a particular idea which is false, 
knowing and intending this to be the case, is not 
to lw absolvPd frmn a eharge of falsehood because 
in anotlwr sense, which will not be conveyed and 
is not intended to be convPyt>d, it is true. In 
::-;uch a east>, howPvPr, nwre proof of the use by 
another of such rnake or word will not of itself 
entitle the complainant to relief, for this would 
be to give to the word full effect as a trade-1nark 
while denying its validity as such. The cmnplain-
ant rnust prove, further, that the defendant used 
it under such circu1nstances or in such a manner 
as to pass off his goods as the goods of the 
complainant. Such circumstances must be made 
out as will show wrongful intent in fact, or justify 
that inference frmn the inevitable consequences 
of the act complained of. When this is done, relief 
against unfair cmnpetition will be awarded by 
requiring the use of the 1nark by another to be 
confined to its primary sense by such limitations 
as will prevent misapprehension upon the ques-
tion of origin. 
Spicer v. W. H. Bull llfedicine Co., 49 F. (2d) 980, 
~)S~ ( 1931) : 
"\V e think it is well established by the above 
and other cases that, even where a secondary 
1neaning of a word is established, others have the 
right to use such word in its primary sense, pro-
vided it is so used as not to lead the public to 
believe that it is purchasing the goods of one 
who has established such secondary meaning." 
G. d'; C . .~.11 crriwn Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. Rep. 
369, 373 ( CCA, 6th Cir., 1912) : 
''Here, then, is presented a conflict of right. 
The alleged trespassing defendant has the right 
13 
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to use the word, because in its primary sense or 
original sense the word is descriptive; but, owing 
to the fact that the word has come to mean to 
' a part of the public, something else, it follows 
that when the defendant approaches that same 
part of the public with the bare word, and with 
nothing else, applied to his goods, he deceives 
that part of the public, and hence he is required 
to accompany his use of the bare word with suf-
ficient distinguishing marks normally to prevent 
the otherwise normally resulting fraud." 
A1nerican W althant Watch Co. v. U. S. Watch Co., 
173 Mass. 85 : 
"Thus it appears that while the first selec-
tion of a descriptive name which later has ac-
quired a secondary meaning does not carry with 
it an exclusive right to its use, yet the first user 
has a right to be protected against one who sub-
sequently so uses the name as to deceive the 
public and thereby take his trade from him; and 
in affording him this protection the later comer, 
when using the name, will be required to distin-
guish his goods and enlighten the trading public." 
Dennison 111fg. v. Thomas Mfg., 94 Fed. 651 (Cir. 
Ct., D. Del., 1899) : 
". . . if such words, marks or symbols 'vere 
used by one of them before the other and by as-
sociation have come to indicate to the public that 
the goods to which they are applied are of the 
production of the former, the latter will not be 
permitted, with intent to mislead the public, to 
use such words, marks, or sy1nbols in such a 
1nanner, by trade dress or otherwise, as to deceive 
or be capable of deceiving the public as to the 
origin, manufacture or ownership of the articles 
to which they are applied; and the latter may be 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rPqnirPd, when using ~uch words, 1nark~, or synl-
bols, to place on articles of his own production 
or the packages in which they are usually sold 
sonwthing clearly denoting the origin, manufac-
ture or ownership of such article~, or negativing 
any idea that they were produced or sold by the 
former." 
Consistent with the law that the only relief the 
plaintiffs ar entitled to is to have the defendant properly 
identify itself are the numerous decisions which have 
considered similar questions wherein specific identifica-
tion requirements have been imposed. See for example 
the cases cited on page 1'7 of the defendant-appellant's 
initial brief and cases found among the many collected 
by the annotator in 66 A.L.R. 948. 
CONCLUSION 
F,rom the cases which have decided matters concern-
ing the acquisition of a "secondary meaning" of generic 
words it would appear conclusive as a matter of law 
that neither of the plaintiffs could have acquired in their 
favor a secondary Ineaning to the words "Security 
Title." Neither of the plaintiffs was the first user of 
the words in the State of Utah nor has either of the 
plaintiffs used the words exclusively, but have permitted 
separate entities in Provo, Farmington and Ogden areas 
to use the words to identify sources other than the 
plaintiff. 
X evertheless, even if the Court is not disposed to 
reconsider the finding that a secondary 1neaning has 
attached to the words "Security Title" in favor of the 
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plaintiff, the plaintiffs are not entitled to a monopoly 
in the use of the words in question but are only Pntitled 
to have the defendant appropriately identify itself. "\Ve 
again invite the Court's review of the numerous decisions 
cited in this and prior briefs supporting this contention. 
In the briefs sub1nitted and oral argument to the 
Court, Counsel has pointed out that the defendant has 
already taken what it thought to be appropriate steps 
of identification. It will, no doubt, be recalled that in 
the use of its corporate name the defendant has con-
sistently identified itself as being a company from Los 
Angeles, California. However, the defendant is willing 
to take any additional steps that this Court deems neces-
sary to remove any probability of confusion between 
itself as a California insurance company and the plain-
tiff Utah corporations. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1\:IcKA Y and BURTON 
and~OY A. Mc:JIURRAY 
1k4 ! ";;J ;;(j / b/[/f' By~I;;:c~;-A:-~I~1lr-,:~;.--Att~;:;;;:_~ 
for Defendant-Appellant / 
720 N" ewhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, l'Ttah 
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